An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges by Boyd, Christina L. & Spriggs, James F., II
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 29 Empirical Research on Decision-Making in the Federal Courts 
2009 
An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court 
Preferences by Federal District Court Judges 
Christina L. Boyd 
Washington University School of Law 
James F. Spriggs II 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Judges Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christina L. Boyd and James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court 
Preferences by Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 037 (2009), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/4 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate 
Court Preferences by Federal District Court Judges 
Christina L. Boyd∗  
James F. Spriggs II∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal district courts’ “inferior position in the hierarchical chain 
of national authority subjects them to more strict Supreme Court 
surveillance.”1 To any scholar of basic political institutions in the 
United States, this statement recites what is likely common belief. 
After all, the federal judiciary is designed as a hierarchy. At the top 
of this judicial hierarchy sits the United States Supreme Court, a body 
responsible for handling, among other things, disputes of national 
importance and those leading to conflict among lower courts. 
Immediately below the Supreme Court are the circuit courts of 
appeals, the twelve intermediate appellate federal courts2 that handle 
the initial round of appeals in all federal cases. And, nearly always, 
the bottom tier of the federal judicial hierarchy belongs to the federal 
district courts, the trial courts for federal litigants.3 
 
 ∗ Christina L. Boyd is a Graduate Student Associate in the Center for Empirical 
Research in the Law (“CERL”) at Washington University School of Law and a Ph.D. candidate 
in political science at Washington University in St. Louis. She holds a J.D. from Wake Forest.  
 ∗∗ James F. Spriggs II is Professor of Political Science, Professor of Law (by courtesy), 
and a Fellow in CERL at Washington University in St. Louis. Spriggs recognizes funding from 
the National Science foundation (Law and Social Science, SES-0550451). 
 1. Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1017, 1022 (1959).  
 2. The federal judiciary also includes a number of specialized courts including, for 
example, the Court of International Trade, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal courts outside the judicial branch include the U.S. 
Tax Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Armed Services, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims, and administrative agency adjudicatory bodies.  
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (2000), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. V 2005). The notable 
exception is federal bankruptcy courts, where appeals go to the federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. 
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In this Article, we tackle the complicated relationships within the 
federal judicial hierarchy with a focus on the relatively understudied 
connection between the Supreme Court and district courts. In Part I, 
we discuss why we should study the hierarchical relationship of 
district courts to their appellate court superiors, focusing on the 
system’s necessity, control provisions, and importance to numerous 
actors. In Part II, we explore the significance of federal district 
courts, the institution of focus in our study. In this section, we detail 
these trial courts’ cumulative decision-making, their policy 
implementation, and the salient decisions that come before them. 
Then, in Part III, we turn to a review of the major literature in this 
area, with work falling in two broad categories: compliance and 
rational anticipation. Part IV focuses on the role of Supreme Court 
precedent in district court decision-making. In Part V, we explicate 
the spatial theory that drives our hypotheses. Our hypotheses explain 
whether and when district courts rationally anticipate their appellate 
court superior’s preferences when citing and interpreting Supreme 
Court precedent. Part VI discusses the research design and data we 
use to test our hypotheses, and Part VII presents the statistical results. 
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this study and 
directions for future research.  
I. WHY STUDY THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL HIERARCHY? 
The federal court system’s hierarchical design is in many ways a 
necessity, for it allows each case to be reviewed without 
overextending judicial resources. At the same time, the hierarchical 
structure of the federal judiciary presumably allows the higher 
appellate courts to maintain control over the legal outcomes of the 
lower courts. The relationship of the courts in the hierarchy to one 
another, and how this relationship affects cases, is something that 
 
§ 158(a) (2000). For more details on bankruptcy appeals, see, e.g., Judith A. McKenna & 
Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625 
(2002). Additionally, administrative agency appeals sometimes (as provided-rarely-in statute) 
go to district courts. See, e.g., David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal 
Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Jonathan 
A. Schorr, Note, The Forum for Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Interpreting Special 
Review Statutes, 63 B.U. L. REV. 765 (1983). 
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matters significantly to at least three groups: (1) scholars, (2) litigants 
and their lawyers, and (3) judges.  
A. The Federal Judicial Hierarchical Structure Is a Necessity 
The federal judiciary’s design enables its courts to handle the vast 
amount of litigation that is filed. At the same time, courts exist to 
give litigants a fair shot at achieving justice. As one anonymous 
judge put it, “we have a responsibility for reaching a correct and just 
result.”4 Because these two goals of efficient workload management 
and justice provisions for litigants may differ from each other, the 
hierarchical nature of the federal court system attempts to provide a 
good balance. Much of this is due to the institutions within the 
federal court system, the distinct roles that they assume, and the 
interactions that they have with one another. 
To begin, a body is needed to handle the entry level of litigation, a 
role designated to trial courts. These courts, known as district courts 
in the federal system, hold jurisdiction based on their geography, with 
each state having at least one court.5 Because litigants have any 
number of reasons for filing lawsuits, the sheer number of cases that 
come before the courts is bound to be large. Figure 1 plots the 
number of district court cases terminated from 1983 to 2006, a 
number that is as low as slightly more than 250,000 in 1983 to more 
than 350,000 in 2006. The organization required to handle all of these 
cases is immense, leading district courts to rely on technological 
advances for assistance.6  
 
 4. THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION 
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 26 (1978).  
 5. Although each state has at least one district court, many have more. California, New 
York, and Texas have the largest number of district courts with four each. For more details on 
the ninety-four district courts, see United States District Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
districtcourts.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). 
 6. A number of outwardly visible signs indicate that federal district courts have risen 
well to the challenge. The increase in the use of electronic case filings and docketing as well as 
the universal access to these materials through PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic 
Records”) is certainly an indicator of the organization already in place for these courts. PACER 
Service Center Home Page, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2009). For more 
on PACER, see, e.g., Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of 
Summary Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 107 (2007). 
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FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF CASES TERMINATED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT 
AND CIRCUIT COURTS, BY YEAR, FROM 1983 TO 2006 
 
Note: The solid line represents terminations in federal district courts; the 
dashed line represents the same for federal courts of appeals. Data compiled 
from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.7 
Similarly, their institutional design helps these courts terminate 
the large body of cases before them. A single judge supervises the 
case and is responsible for making decisions throughout the 
proceedings, and these actions have a real impact on the case’s 
outcome.8 Throughout the proceedings, the case’s factual record is 
 
 7. Federal Court Management Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
 8. The district court judge often receives assistance from a magistrate judge, a non-
Article III judge who is appointed to serve a district court for eight years (full time) or four 
years (part time). Under the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968, magistrate judges may determine 
pretrial matters, conduct hearings, try misdemeanors, and, upon the consent of the parties, 
conduct civil jury and bench proceedings. Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631–39 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402, 3060 (2000)). According to the 
Act’s legislative history, its purpose is “to cull from the ever-growing workload of the U.S. 
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established. Lawyers and litigants actively participate in the case 
proceedings, so much so that many argue that in trial courts the 
judges act as managers of the case and the real case activity exists 
outside of the court’s direct supervision.9 Within this adversarial 
process, the opposing parties have many opportunities to settle their 
cases, something that frequently happens10 and is at times actively 
encouraged by the presiding judge.11  
Even though an appeal from a federal district court to the 
appropriate federal court of appeals is generally an appeal of right, 
losing litigants do not appeal every defeat. Rather, the choice to 
appeal is often one tempered by strategy, costs, and anticipation.12 On 
appeal, the number of cases is drastically smaller. As is evident in 
Figure 1, the number of cases filed in the courts of appeals amounts 
to a much smaller raw number than is present at the trial court level 
(although this number has risen since the early 1980s).13  
Whether the appeal is taken because of an anticipated reversal, to 
force a settlement, to achieve exposure, or to achieve long-term 
policy gains, the proceedings that occurred in the case while in the 
trial court continue to have a large effect on the further developments 
of the case. As Judge Frank Coffin notes,  
 
district courts matters that are more desirably performed by a lower tier of judicial officers.” 
United States v. Richardson, 57 F.R.D. 196 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES ACT, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.A.N. 4255). 
 9. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).  
 10. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related 
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (finding that trials 
are declining and settlements are on the rise); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 137 (2002) (noting the “continuing dominance of 
settlement” in federal litigation); Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? 
Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of 
Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004). According to Priest and Klein, 
settlement is often the rational outcome for a case. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 11. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 494, 528 (1986) (“Many federal judges have begun to perceive themselves as being in 
the business of settlement as much as (sometimes more than) in the business of adjudication.”). 
 12. See, e.g., SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL 
CASES (1999). 
 13. Note, however, that there still are lingering concerns about overextending COAs. A 
solution for this has been to have district court judges serve by designation on the COAs. 
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Unlike a congressional committee, a government department 
head, or a business executive, an appellate court may not 
consider every last piece of information that comes to its 
attention. It is restricted in two ways: it must confine itself to 
the factual record established in the trial court or 
administrative agency, and it must generally recognize only 
those legal issues which were raised in the trial court.14 
Nonetheless, cases on appeal face a different set of procedures and 
a different institutional design than they did in district courts. 
Importantly, cases on appeal are now heard by a collegial body of 
judges. In cases heard in the courts of appeals, a panel of three judges 
is typically assigned to the case.15 Further review at these appellate 
courts may lead to an en banc hearing, where all or many of the 
active judges in the circuit decide the case.16 And, of course, cases 
receiving plenary review at the Supreme Court are always heard en 
banc. 
Collegial decision-making is (potentially) quite different from 
merely having an individual decision-maker. The benefits of this 
environment are described by Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek in 
their book Judging on a Collegial Court: 
 
 14. Frank M. Coffin, Reflections from the Appellate Bench: Deciding Appeals, Work 
Cycle, and Collaborating with Law Clerks, VIEWS FROM THE BENCH: THE JUDICIARY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 56 (Mark W. Cannon & David M. Obrien eds., 1985). 
 15. The parties generally have no way of knowing this panel composition upon the 
decision to appeal. In fact, depending on the circuit, the identities of the three judges presiding 
over a case are not known until approximately oral arguments. See, e.g., UNITED STATES 
COURTS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, FIRST CIRCUIT INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES § VIII(B) 
(2008), available at http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/files/rules/rulebook.pdf (“The names of the 
judges on each panel may be disclosed for a particular session seven (7) days in advance of the 
session”). But see, e.g., UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES § II.B.8(a) (2007), available 
at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content/Court+Rules+and+Operating+ 
Procedures (follow “Handbook”) (“Ordinarily, the Court discloses merits panels to counsel in 
the order setting the case for oral argument.”) 
 16. In all circuit courts but the Ninth Circuit, en banc review includes all circuit judges. 
For the Ninth Circuit, the court has instituted limited en banc review, a feature that allows for 
ten randomly selected circuit judges and the chief judge to review a case. UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND 
NINTH CIRCUIT RULES 35-3 (2007), available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents. 
nsf/FRAP+and+Circuit+Rules?OpenView. 
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On appeal, litigants can be assured of review by a body 
composed of several judges. The rationale underlying this 
system is that arbitrary decision making in collegial bodies will 
be reduced by the moderating influence of alternative points of 
view. Since the panel outcome is governed by majority rule, 
the litigant will not be subjected to the errant or 
unconventional ideas of any one panel member.17  
Thus, while the average appellate judge is not necessarily better 
than a trial judge at providing “justice,”18 the requirement that she 
reach consensus with other judges does provide additional 
protections. Or, as Judge Coffin puts it, “an appellate judge is no 
wiser than a trial judge. His only claim to superior judgment lies in 
numbers; three, five, seven, or nine heads are usually better than 
one.”19  
B. The Federal Judicial Hierarchy Provides Control  
With interactions between courts that are both regular and 
ordered, the design of the federal court system arguably creates 
principal-agent relationships between the courts. In this model, higher 
appellate courts serve as the principal to their lower-tiered brethren.20 
 
 17. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON 
FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 1 (2006). 
 18. But see Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Trial and Appellate Judges: How Do They Differ?, 
36 W. POL. Q. 570, 570 (1983) (“Conventional wisdom suggests that the more prestigious U.S. 
Courts of Appeals will be staffed by judges who are ‘better’ trained and more ‘qualified’ in 
several respects than their counterparts on the U.S. District Courts.”). 
 19. Coffin, supra note 14, at 56.  
 20. Kornhauser espouses an alternative to principal-agency theory known as team theory. 
Of this theory, he says:  
I treat the judicial system as a team and argue that the optimal structure of the judicial 
system is determined by the extent of a resource constraint, the nature of the flow of 
cases into the system, and the difficulty of law-finding. The flow of cases to the courts 
and the style and competence of judicial reasoning determine the desirability of 
hierarchy and of specialization as well as the extent of precedent within the system. . . . 
I assume that the “judicial team” seeks to maximize the expected number of “correct” 
answers subject to its resource constraint.  
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1605–06 (1995); see also Chad 
Westerland et al., Lower Court Defiance of (Compliance with) the U.S. Supreme Court (July 
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In his 1984 article in The American Journal of Political Science, 
Terry Moe famously describes the basic tenants of principal-agency 
theory: 
The principal-agent model is an analytic expression of the 
agency relationship, in which one party, the principal, 
considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, 
the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently 
choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the 
principal.21  
Given that political actors, particularly high-ranking ones, “are 
most troubled by insufficient time and information,”22 there is often a 
need for the delegation of substantial work and discretion. This 
delegation can range from simple administrative tasks to broad 
policymaking roles. Due to the principal’s reliance on his agent after 
delegation has taken place (in addition to his need to delegate in the 
first place), Moe warns of the dangers of the implicit moral hazard.23 
He says that “there is no guarantee that the agent, once hired, will in 
fact choose to pursue the principal’s best interests or to do so 
efficiently. The agent has his own interests at heart . . . .”24 Because 
of this moral hazard, principals must properly incentivize their agents 
to prevent shirking of the type described above.25 When agents are 
 
17, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/ 
compliancefirst.pdf).  
 21. Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 739, 756 
(1984).  
 22. H. Owen Porter, Legislative Information Needs and Staff Resources in the American 
States, in LEGISLATIVE STAFFING: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 40 (James J. Heaphey & 
Alan P. Balutis eds., 1975).  
 23. The idea of moral hazards has its origin in the insurance context. A moral hazard is 
“[t]he risk that an insured will destroy property or allow it to be destroyed (usu. by burning) in 
order to collect the insurance proceeds.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 723 (7th ed. 1999). Moral 
hazard is now a widely used component of principal-agent theorizing. See Gary J. Miller, The 
Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 203 (2005). 
 24. Moe, supra note 21, at 756.  
 25. Miller, supra note 23; see also Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy of Justice: 
Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 673, 673 (1994) (“Principal-agent theory explicitly questions the degree to which agents 
act on behest of their principals versus the extent to which they shirk (i.e., the extent to which 
they act on their own behalf), and the extent to which control mechanisms by the principal can 
minimize shirking.”).  
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treated properly (as described by Moe), principals can delegate their 
workload to them and at the same time maintain control over their 
output.26  
This design is ideal for the federal judicial system. The Supreme 
Court’s role under its constitutional mandate makes it the high court 
in the land. As such, it is a national policy-maker. At the same time, 
however, the Court can hear only a small proportion of cases, a 
number that in recent years hovers below one hundred.27 With such a 
limited discretionary caseload, in most circumstances the Supreme 
Court has in essence delegated the role of final appellate decision-
maker to the courts of appeals. With such a delegation, “most 
decisions of the courts of appeals will escape consideration by the 
Supreme Court,”28 meaning that “the U.S. Courts of Appeals have 
become the de facto (if not the de jure) venue for final appellate 
review.”29 Under this scheme, although the Supreme Court might 
rarely intervene in cases, its monitoring of the activity of these lower 
appellate courts allows it to actively retain its appellate role where 
noncompliance is rampant. Such power likely explains the observed 
variability in review of the circuits by the Supreme Court.30  
 
 26. Moe, supra note 21, at 756–57. 
 27. See Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 403 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure led to a steady decline in the Court’s 
docket size); see also Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda 
Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807 (1990).  
 28. Songer et al., supra note 25, at 675.  
 29. HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 17, at 89. This role is appropriate:  
Even if the Supreme Court were to overrule appellate court decisions three-quarters of 
the time, the U.S. courts of appeals would still be making decisions that formally 
prevailed in more than 98 percent of their cases. This indicates that the role held by the 
intermediate appellate courts in shaping legal policy is significant. While the Supreme 
Court may indicate the broad outlines of a certain policy, much of the burden of giving 
detailed shape to that policy will be carried by the intermediate appellate courts. 
JOHN C. HUGHES, THE FEDERAL COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 40 (Marcus Boggs 
ed., 1995) (internal footnote omitted).  
 30. Justice Scalia has said that it is a “disproportionate segment of [the Supreme] Court's 
discretionary docket that is consistently devoted to reviewing Ninth Circuit judgments, and to 
reversing them by lop-sided margins.” Kevin M. Scott, U.S. Supreme Court Reversals: 
Supreme Court Reversal of the Ninth Circuit, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 341, 344 (2006) (quoting 
Antonin Scalia, Submitted Testimony to the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the 
Federal Courts of Appeals (1998)). 
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Yet, to be an effective and legitimate institution,31 its lower courts 
must act consistently with the Supreme Court’s implicit and explicit 
mandates. Some suggest that such self-constraint among lower courts 
is most likely when their chances of reversal are high.32 Others, 
however, note that because the litigants decide to appeal after the 
court issues its judgment, “[t]he decisions in which circuit judges 
follow their own preferences should be the most likely to be 
appealed,”33 particularly when those preferences do not align with the 
higher court.  
C. The Federal Judicial Hierarchy Matters to Actors  
While the structure of the federal judicial hierarchy is well known, 
the same is not necessarily true for the relationship of the courts to 
one another. Understanding these hierarchical relationships is critical 
to three actors who care about federal courts: (1) scholars, (2) 
litigants and lawyers, and (3) judges. For scholars, and especially 
those empirically examining court decisions, much has been done to 
account for the presence of the tiers in the judiciary. Models of this 
process include such explanatory variables as direction of the lower 
court decision,34 presence of dissent,35 and ideology of median 
appellate judges,36 all of which are designed to capture, albeit at 
 
 31. When an institution is legitimate, citizens are willing to accept its authority. JAMES L. 
GIBSON, OVERCOMING APARTHEID: CAN TRUTH RECONCILE A DIVIDED NATION? 4 (2004). 
Empirical evidence indicates that this is indeed the case for courts in the United States. See, 
e.g., James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 354 (2003). 
 32. See, e.g., David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation for 
Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003). 
 33. Songer et al., supra note 25, at 675; see also Donald R. Songer et al., Do Judges 
Follow the Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 137 (2003) (finding that 
courts of appeals judges deciding tort cases follow law, even when there is little chance that the 
Supreme Court will reverse their decisions).  
 34. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda 
Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109 (1988); Christina L. Boyd et al., 
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging (July 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1001748). 
 35. See, e.g., Charles A. Johnson, Law, Politics, and Judicial Decision Making: Lower 
Federal Court Uses of Supreme Court Decisions, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 325, 329 (1987); 
HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 17. 
 36. See, e.g., Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMPIR. LEGAL 
STUD. 369 (2005); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme 
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times implicitly, a higher or lower court’s effect on an individual 
case. In addition, explaining these hierarchical relationships is key to 
understanding the composition of cases in each level of the judiciary. 
After all, the cases that are appealed and advance into each higher tier 
represent a non-random sample of all cases that are litigated.37 
For the litigant, the structure of the judiciary plays a pragmatic 
role. Litigants want to be able to predict outcomes at all stages so 
they can determine when to settle and when to continue pursuing 
litigation. The result of this bargaining and forecasting is that “the 
disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will 
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of 
all disputes.”38 Litigants also make similar predictions when it comes 
to whether to appeal a case.  
Finally, for judges in the judicial hierarchy, this system governs 
relationships, imposes decision constraints, and affects future 
employment opportunities. Judges want to know if their opinions and 
directives are going to be respected and, generally speaking, want to 
avoid reversal.39 These same actors often are driven by career 
advancement, something that in the federal judiciary means 
consideration for appointment to a higher bench.40  
II. DISTRICT COURTS IN THE FEDERAL HIERARCHY 
Within the federal judicial hierarchy, the institutional actor 
undoubtedly receiving the least systematic and empirical attention is 
 
Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1285–87 (2005).  
 37. For more on the selection of cases, see, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, 
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991); Priest & Klein, supra note 10; Jonathan Kastellec & Jeffrey Lax, 
Can We Ignore Case Selection When We Study Judicial Politics? (Oct. 22, 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with authors). 
 38. Priest & Klein, supra note 10, at 4.  
 39. See, e.g., Klein & Hume, supra note 32; David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The 
Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 
371 (1999). But see Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic 
Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1273 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court reviews 
too few cases to allow it to serve as an active reversal constraint on courts of appeals judges).  
 40. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817 (1994); see also HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 17, at 23. 
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the federal district court.41 Although data limitations or 
methodological reasons help explain this,42 the result is that we lack 
information on how this lowest tier of the federal judiciary fits into 
the system.43 Despite the relative lack of scholarship focused on these 
actors, the evidence is overwhelming that district courts are 
important, and not just to the individual parties before them in a case. 
Their importance includes their filtering duty, their policy-making 
function, and their implementation role.  
District courts are the workhorses of the federal judiciary. They 
handle the mass of litigation and serve a filtering role for the rest of 
the judicial branch. Indeed, for most federal litigants, these trial 
courts are their only encounter with the justice system. As one district 
court judge put it, “[j]ustice stops in the district. They either get it 
here or they can’t get it at all.”44  
District courts might not receive as much attention from scholars 
or the media as other federal courts, but they do have a central policy-
making role to play. Mather, for example, argues that district courts 
are well positioned to make a cumulative policy impact through the 
actions and decisions of judges, parties, lawyers, and juries.45 As she 
 
 41. See Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published and 
Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7 (1999). 
 42. Although some district court data are publicly available, see, e.g., Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research, Federal Court Cases: Integrated Databases, 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR/SERIES/00072.xml (last visited Feb. 20, 2009), 
nothing as systematic or thorough, such as the Spaeth Supreme Court Database, is publicly 
available for these lower courts. See Supreme Court Database, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/ 
sctdata.htm (follow “Original U.S. Supreme Court Database” hyperlinks for documentation and 
data in different formats) (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). 
 43. As Caminker notes, “[t]his imbalanced attention is a bit curious, given that lower 
courts, ‘as a matter of empirical fact, play a far more important role in the actual lives of 
citizens than does the Supreme Court.’” Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81–82 (1994) 
(quoting Sanford Levinson, On Positivism and Potted Plants: “Inferior” Judges and the Task 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 25 CONN. L. REV. 843, 844 (1993)). 
 44. David M. O’Brien, Introduction to Part II of VIEWS FROM THE BENCH, supra note 14, 
at 29 (citation omitted).  
 45. Lynn Mather, The Fired Football Coach (or, How Trial Courts Make Policy), in 
CONTEMPLATING COURTS (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); see also HENRY R. GLICK, COURTS, 
POLITICS, AND JUSTICE (1983); MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 
(1964). 
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puts it, “the accumulation of similar individual decisions defines 
policy just as much as one major decision.”46  
The ultimate example of the implementation role held by district 
courts comes from the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education47 
and the subsequent school desegregation battles. Although the 
Supreme Court made a lasting national impression with its decision 
in Brown, the implementation of this decision was left to the federal 
district courts. As the Supreme Court said in Brown II:48 
[T]he courts may consider problems related to administration, 
arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the 
school transportation system, personnel, revision of school 
districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a 
system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations 
which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. . . . 
[The] cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such 
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with 
this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public 
schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all 
deliberate speed the parties to these cases.49 
In their study of the degree of school segregation remaining in 
1970, Giles and Walker found that more desegregation had taken 
place when school districts were smaller as well as when the schools 
were in areas outlying the judges’ courts.50  
For every high-profile Supreme Court case, there is a lower court 
case to match. Without a doubt, many of these cases held a low 
national profile while proceedings were taking place in the trial court. 
But some were highly visible from filing. And some cases that likely 
will never reach the Supreme Court are nonetheless headline grabbers 
while in the district courts, including, for example, the recent case 
 
 46. Mather, supra note 45, at 173. 
 47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 48. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
 49. Id. at 300–01. 
 50. Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School 
Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917 (1975). 
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involving the unauthorized Harry Potter Encyclopedia51 or the case 
of Richard Reid, better known as the Shoe Bomber.52 
III. THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE IN REVIEW 
Given this brief background on the federal judicial hierarchy and 
district courts within that hierarchy, clearly the relationship of these 
courts to one another is ripe for systematic scholarly review. In areas 
of compliance of lower courts with higher court preferences and the 
anticipation of higher court action by lower courts, this is exactly 
what many scholars have given it.  
A. Compliance 
Understanding the hierarchical design of the federal court system 
and the seemingly small amount of direct intervention by the 
Supreme Court, a number of scholars have sought to empirically test 
for the compliance of lower courts to higher court decision-making. 
Compliance or noncompliance is “behavior that is in some way 
consistent or inconsistent with the behavioral requirements of the 
judicial decision.”53  
For example, Gruhl’s examination of lower court libel cases finds 
strong evidence of compliance by these courts with Supreme Court 
doctrine.54 This study complements Baum’s work from the same year 
on patent cases.55 Baum finds that federal district courts’ policies are 
directly connected to those of the courts of appeals, leading him to 
conclude that “courts of appeals exert real influence over the 
decisions of their subordinates.”56 
 
 51. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  
 52. United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002).  
 53. BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND IMPACT 17 (1999).  
 54. John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by Lower 
Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502 (1980). 
 55. Lawrence Baum, Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: 
An Exploration, 33 W. POL. Q. 217 (1980). 
 56. Id. at 223. Baum notes that the strength of this relationship is limited, and as such, the 
courts of appeals do not have control in “any absolute sense.” Id. at 224. 
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The large number of studies focusing on courts of appeals’ 
compliance with Supreme Court decisions has found overwhelming 
evidence of compliance.57 Benesh and Reddick examine lower court 
compliance with Supreme Court precedent when that precedent has 
been recently altered.58 They find that variables such as age of the 
overruled precedent, change in Supreme Court composition, and case 
complexity predict compliance and the speed thereof.59 Similar 
findings for these courts, albeit with different research designs, can 
be found in work by Songer and Sheehan,60 Klein,61 and Westerland 
et al.62 In addition, similar levels of compliance have been found 
between the Supreme Court and administrative agencies coming 
before the Court.63 
Thus, while this relatively large body of articles utilizes different 
methods and courts for testing for compliance (or lack thereof), their 
findings are generally consistent: although some examples of skirting 
compliance have been found, no work has found systematic non-
compliance among lower courts of the decision-making of higher 
federal appellate courts. As such, the existing work seems to affirm 
the effectiveness of higher federal courts in maintaining control and 
eliminating widespread shirking.64 
 
 57. For an excellent review of compliance studies, see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court 
Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (2007).  
 58. Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower 
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002).  
 59. The authors utilize an event history analysis to study “not only compliance but also 
the speed with which the circuits comply.” Id. at 541. 
 60. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and 
Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43 W. POL. 
Q. 297 (1990) (finding that, in general, federal courts of appeals comply with the Supreme 
Court (or at least do not completely defy it)). 
 61. DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2002) 
(finding that circuit courts comply with Supreme Court precedent when the precedent is clear).  
 62. Westerland et al., supra note 20.  
 63. See James F. Spriggs II, The Supreme Court and Federal Administrative Agencies: A 
Resource-Based Theory and Analysis of Judicial Impact, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1122 (1996); 
James F. Spriggs II, Explaining Federal Bureaucratic Compliance with Supreme Court 
Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997).  
 64. Of course, this observed tendency is observationally equivalent with another 
explanation—that higher courts strategically anticipate lower court non-compliance and write 
opinions that they expect lower courts will follow. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 1. 
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B. Rational Anticipation 
Although the compliance literature examines whether and how 
judges respond to existing Court precedent, a separate literature 
accounts for lower courts’ anticipation of future judicial actions 
within the hierarchy. Under theories of anticipation, lower courts will 
temper their activities in the present based on what they expect will 
happen with the case in the future. This future gazing includes 
expectations on whether the case will be appealed, if the case will be 
granted certiorari (if the appeal is to the Supreme Court), and what 
the outcome on that appeal will be. Judge Jerome Frank spoke of 
judicial anticipation in these strong words: “when a lower court 
perceives a pronounced new doctrinal trend in Supreme Court 
decisions, it is its duty, cautiously to be sure, to follow not to resist 
it.”65  
A number of studies have utilized anticipation theories. Many of 
these, such as Caminker, speak of anticipation in a largely theoretical 
framework.66 Others, however, aim to provide empirical tests of 
judicial anticipation. Much of this work focuses on the theory of 
dynamic interpretation. An early proponent of this theory, Eskridge 
develops a model around the dynamic interactions of the Supreme 
Court, congressional committees, Congress, and the President.67 As 
he says, “[t]he game is a dynamic one because each player is 
responsive to the preferences of other players and because the 
preferences of the players change as information is generated and 
distributed in the game.”68 Applied within the judicial hierarchy, 
dynamic interpretation basically means that judges will not take 
simply the cases that older courts have decided as good law. Rather, 
these judges will think about the preferences of the current higher 
courts when determining (assessing probabilistically) if the current 
higher court is still wedded to its former decisions.  
 
 65. Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208, 218 (1942), quoted in Murphy, 
supra note 1, at 1026. 
 66. See Caminker, supra note 43. 
 67. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). 
 68. Id. at 334.  
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While the anticipation literature is not nearly as deep as that 
regarding compliance, the empirical results thus far are highly 
divergent. For instance, Benesh’s study of courts of appeals’ 
anticipation of the Supreme Court in the area of the law of 
confessions suggestions they do rationally anticipate the superior 
tribunal.69 Some as-of-yet unpublished findings in this difficult 
research area find a similar relationship. Randazzo, for example, 
examines a sample of federal district court cases decided from 1925 
to 1996 that were reviewed by courts of appeals.70 He finds that with 
civil liberties and economics cases, “[i]f the federal trial judges 
anticipate a negative response on appeal, then they curtail their 
ideological influences.”71 Similarly, Westerland et al.’s 2006 
conference paper finds that circuit court judges engage in “dynamic 
hierarchical interpretation,” and as such, these courts are particularly 
concerned about the current Supreme Court’s preferences (rather 
than, for example, their own ideological preferences or the 
ideological position of the Supreme Court’s old precedent).72 Works 
by David Klein73 and Frank Cross,74 however, fail to find support for 
courts of appeals’ strategic anticipation of the Supreme Court. In 
short, the literature presents a set of mixed results regarding whether 
lower courts rationally anticipate their appellate court superiors, and 
thus this study is a needed step toward resolving this debate.  
IV. THE ROLE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT IN DISTRICT COURT 
DECISION-MAKING  
District courts, when adjudicating disputes and answering the 
legal questions brought before them, produce at least two outcomes. 
First, they determine if the plaintiff suffered a wrong, and, if so, what 
 
 69. SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE (2002). 
 70. Kirk A. Randazzo, Strategic Anticipation and the Hierarchy of Justice in the U.S. 
District Courts (Feb. 1, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1114207). 
 71. Id. at 21.  
 72. Westerland et al., supra note 20, at 2 (emphasis removed). 
 73. KLEIN, supra note 61. 
 74. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007); Cross, 
supra note 36. 
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remedy is appropriate. In other words, they produce a disposition, 
which determines who wins the case. Second, district courts set 
broader legal and public policy when deciding a case. In so doing, 
they not only affect the direct litigants in a case but also potentially 
influence a larger set of actors in society and thus cause distributional 
effects.75  
These effects result in large part from legal doctrine, which 
provides referents for behavior in society. Law is a set of rules that 
enables actors to anticipate the consequences of their actions by 
forecasting answers to potential legal questions. Law in this sense 
reduces uncertainty in society. Although a given opinion (or even a 
series of decisions) does not eliminate legal uncertainty (due to 
indeterminacy of language, changing social conditions, and so on), 
law nevertheless affects outcomes by influencing actors’ expectations 
of how other actors and judges might respond to the choices they 
make.76  
Long ago, famed political scientist Walter Murphy wrote of the 
relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts, noting that 
“[t]he Supreme Court typically formulates general policy. Lower 
courts apply that policy, and working in its interstices, inferior judges 
may materially modify the High Court’s determinations.”77 Federal 
district courts certainly count as the “lower courts” to which Murphy 
refers. When ruling on motions or more generally presiding over 
cases, federal district court judges will often cite to the Supreme 
Court for support for their decisions. In Retired Public Employees’ 
Association of California v. California,78 for example, Judge Orrick’s 
decision on the plaintiff’s request for an injunction relied heavily on 
the Supreme Court’s relevant precedent: 
Although the Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ third claim is 
founded on the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, the Eleventh 
 
 75. See, e.g., Ringquist & Emmert, supra note 41. 
 76. For work discussing law as a set of legal rules, see, e.g., FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES 
F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the Law: Judicial Politics and Legal 
Change, 59 J. POL. 778 (1997). 
 77. Murphy, supra note 1, at 1018. 
 78. 614 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
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Amendment is an explicit limitation on the judicial power of 
the United States. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court overturned 
an award of injunctive relief against state officials and 
agencies based on a pendent state law claim. The Court found 
that the Eleventh Amendment was a constitutional bar to a 
federal court’s jurisdiction over a pendent state claim against 
the state and state officials and agencies. Pennhurst is 
controlling here. Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to 
consider plaintiffs’ third claim for relief in the 1977 
complaint.79 
And we could give countless other examples that proceed 
identically to Retired Public Employees’ Association and show that 
federal district court judges are often called upon to apply and 
interpret Supreme Court precedent. As seen in Figure 2, federal 
district courts frequently cite the Supreme Court as a legal authority 
for their decisions, and in recent history they do so tens of thousands 
of times each year.80  
Following common law tradition and the norm of stare decisis—
by which judges are bound to decide cases consistent with the rulings 
in similar, prior, mandatory authority cases—judges use analogical 
reasoning.81 This entails determining whether and how a precedent 
applies to the factual scenario in a legal dispute they are deciding.82 
To make these determinations, judges draw two key pieces of 
information from precedent. First, precedent informs judges which 
facts are relevant for deciding a particular kind of legal dispute and 
which fact situations should be grouped together and treated 
similarly. The information conveyed by a precedent thus helps judges 
determine when a precedent is similar enough to a subsequent legal 
 
 79. Id. at 581 (internal citations omitted). 
 80. These data are taken from James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: 
Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 
324 (2007).  
 81. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142–80 
(1960); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Ruggero J. 
Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill 
It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990). 
 82. See, e.g., Aldisert, supra note 81; Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 
(1987). 
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dispute to be applicable to it. Second, precedent provides tests or 
standards for judges to employ in the context of particular factual 
circumstances. That is, precedent gives judges criteria for 
determining whether a legal wrong has occurred and how it might be 
remedied.  
This process of district court judges’ citing and interpreting 
precedent produces a form of legal change. Law changes as judges 
decide whether and how to apply an existing precedent to a factual 
situation not directly considered in the precedent-setting case. 
Hansford and Spriggs’s description of this process at the Supreme 
Court is equally applicable to district courts:  
The Court rarely defines doctrine in a comprehensive or 
complete manner in any one opinion. It sometimes takes a 
series of opinions to clarify a rule, fill in important details, and 
define its scope or breadth. When Court opinions legally treat 
or interpret an existing precedent they shape it by restricting or 
broadening its applicability. Legal rules or precedents can thus 
evolve as the Court interprets them over time.83  
Like the Supreme Court, district courts shape existing law by 
applying and interpreting precedent. 
The law is thus a dynamic entity that develops over time as courts 
choose which precedents to cite and how to interpret them. Previous 
research characterizes the interpretation of precedent as broadly 
falling into two categories, positive and negative treatment.84 A court 
positively interprets a precedent when it invokes it as a legal 
authority and follows its legal holding or reasoning. The positive 
interpretation of precedent can expand the meaning and scope of a 
precedent, especially when the precedent is applied to factual 
circumstances not considered by it. A court negatively treats a 
precedent when it uses language that restricts the reach of the case, 
calls into question its legal authority, or even chooses not to apply it 
to a setting. The negative interpretation of precedent includes milder 
forms of treatment, such as the distinguishing of precedent, whereby 
 
 83. See THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT ON 
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 5–6 (2006) (internal footnotes and citations omitted). 
 84. See id. 
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a court determines that a precedent is inapplicable to a case. It also 
includes stronger forms of negative treatment, such as limiting a 
precedent to its facts or, if a court has authority to do so, overruling a 
precedent and declaring that it is no longer binding law.  
Simply put, citation and interpretation of precedent is integral to 
the development of law. When lower courts choose to cite Supreme 
Court precedent and treat it negatively or positively, they are helping 
to shape the meaning and reach of that case. Therefore, district court 
judges actively participate in creating law and policy. 
FIGURE 2: TOTAL NUMBER OF DISTRICT COURT CITATIONS TO 
U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT FROM 1970 TO 200585 
 
 
 85. Fowler et al., supra note 80. 
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V. A SPATIAL MODEL OF THE HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP  
We turn now to a spatial model that lays out hypotheses 
concerning how district courts interpret precedent in light of the 
hierarchical relationship appellate courts have over them. We base 
our spatial model on two assumptions. First, we follow a long 
tradition in the judicial politics literature and assume that judges have 
policy preferences over legal rules.86 Judges, like nearly all political 
decision-makers, possess ideological points of view, and these 
attitudes lead them to care about the effects their decisions will have 
on society. Judges therefore prefer legal rules that are likely to 
produce outcomes most consistent with their ideological orientations. 
Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck, when explaining the opinion-
writing process at the Supreme Court, refer to this assumption as the 
“Outcome Postulate,” by which “Justices prefer Court opinions and 
legal rules that reflect their policy preferences.”87  
It follows that district court judges will react to Supreme Court 
precedent based in part on their ideological orientations. Judges 
recognize that the reach and meaning of a precedent is a central 
element of the law, and they therefore desire to interpret precedent in 
ways consistent with their policy preferences. By doing so, they can 
influence how other actors view a precedent, affect the choices they 
may make in light of the precedent, and thereby influence 
distributional outcomes. We therefore argue that the ideological 
distance between the district court and the Supreme Court precedent 
should influence the likelihood and way that the district court utilizes 
it.  
To more formally depict this idea, Figure 3 presents a one-
dimensional ideological policy space. D represents the district court’s 
position in that ideological space, and P represents the ideological 
location of the relevant Supreme Court precedent. When D and P are 
aligned, or at least close to each other, it is easy to imagine 
precedential deference (for either ideological or normative reasons). 
But as D and P grow further apart, district courts for policy-based 
 
 86. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); HANSFORD & 
SPRIGGS, supra note 83; MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 76.  
 87. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 17. 
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reasons will desire to “shirk” from the law as laid down by the 
Supreme Court. Our ideological distance hypothesis states this 
relationship more formally.  
FIGURE 3: IDEOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP OF A DISTRICT COURT (D) 
AND RELEVANT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT (P) 
Note: Ideological Distance Hypothesis: A district court will be less likely to 
cite or positively interpret a Supreme Court precedent (and more likely to 
treat a precedent negatively) when it is ideologically further from the 
precedent. 
Second, we assume that the hierarchical relationship of the 
appellate courts to the district courts incentivizes district court judges 
to consider the appellate court’s policy preferences when deciding 
cases. This assumption is consistent with the literature, most of which 
argues that although judges act on their policy preferences, they also 
are constrained by a variety of institutional rules. Examples of such 
rules include the collegial nature of appellate courts,88 legal norms 
(such as stare decisis),89 and the process of oral argument.90 The rule 
we focus on is the hierarchical ladder in the federal judicial system. 
Both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court are vertically superior 
to the district courts, and each has the ability to set precedent that 
district courts must follow. Because of this relationship, district 
courts are bound to consider the law as set by not only the Supreme 
Court but also the circuit courts.  
 
 88. See id.; HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 17; EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 86. 
 89. See, e.g., HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 83; Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The 
Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018 (1996); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. 
Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005).  
 90. See, e.g., TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2004).  
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Because the courts of appeals are the final appellate review for 
most cases, they are the first principals that district court judges are 
likely to consider. This idea is consistent with previous scholars’ 
theories on how agents consider multiple principals. Lindquist and 
Haire, for example, note that in the context of courts of appeals as 
agents to the Supreme Court and Congress, judicial agents “might be 
expected to weigh more heavily the preferences of those principals 
who exercise direct supervisory control over their activities.”91 In this 
Article, we therefore focus on the appeals courts’ supervisory role 
over the district courts, and we do not factor in the Supreme Court’s 
similar role.  
Although recognizing the supervisory role of circuit courts is easy 
in theory, in practice it becomes much more difficult. This is due in 
large part to the way courts of appeals decide cases. Because circuit 
cases are heard in panels of three, the composition of which is not 
decided until after the appeal, the district court judge faces 
uncertainty as to the ideological preferences of the reviewing circuit 
panel. Nonetheless, (1) circuits have an ideological environment or 
identity, and (2) circuit rules make the en banc court the only court 
that can overturn circuit precedent. Although neither of these factors 
provides certainty to district court judges about what might happen in 
the case upon appellate review, they are likely to help create a sense 
of the case’s future.  
 
 91. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Susan B. Haire, Decision Making by an Agent with Multiple 
Principals, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 237 (James R. Rogers et 
al. eds., 2006). When considering courts of appeals as agents to the Supreme Court and 
Congress, Lindquist and Haire note that they “expect the Supreme Court’s effect to be 
magnified because of its supervisory role over the appeals courts in the federal judicial 
hierarchy.” Id. at 238; see also James C. Brent, An Agent and Two Principals: U.S. Court of 
Appeals Responses to Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 27 AM. POL. Q. 236 (1999). The role of multiple principals 
also has been noted with regard to district courts:  
District judges may find themselves “trying to please two masters” when the 
preferences of their circuit superiors are at odds with those of the Supreme Court. And 
while the Supreme Court generally does not have direct sanctioning authority over the 
district court, the Supreme Court’s judgments influence those of the district court’s 
immediate superior in important ways. 
Susan B. Haire et al., Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical 
Perspective, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 143, 148 (2003).  
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As a result, we expect that district courts’ interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent depends not only on their preferences but 
also on their expectations of the likely response of the appellate court 
to their decision. For a variety of reasons, including fear of reversal 
and the desire to be elevated to a circuit court, district court judges 
have incentives to anticipate how the courts of appeals will react to 
different ways of deciding a case.92 District court judges will thus 
choose how to interpret Supreme Court precedent based in part on the 
relevant circuit court’s ideological viewpoint. This expectation 
therefore leads us to include an additional actor, the appellate court, 
in the spatial model.  
Figure 4 depicts the four possible arrangements (or regimes) of a 
district court, a circuit court, and a Supreme Court precedent.93 Under 
Regime I, the appellate court (A) is ideologically closer to the 
Supreme Court precedent (P) than is the district court. Although a 
district court prefers to negatively interpret precedents that are 
ideologically more distant from it, the appellate court’s closer 
proximity to the precedent can temper this relationship. Regime II 
depicts a scenario in which the District Court (D) is ideologically 
closer to the precedent than is the appellate court, and we expect this 
spatial configuration to decrease the district court’s propensity to 
positively interpret precedent. It does so due to the district court’s 
strategic anticipation of the likely response of the appellate court. In 
Regime III, P is in between D and A, and the degree to which the 
district court may deviate from its preferred interpretation will 
depend on whether the appellate court is further from P than it is. 
Finally, Regime IV is a situation in which there is no appellate court 
constraint, given that D and A share the same policy preference. 
 
 92. See, e.g., HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 17. 
 93. One should recognize that each of these regimes also has a mirror image. For 
example, the mirror image of Regime I is the following: D < A < P. 
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FIGURE 4: IDEOLOGICAL SPACE RELATIONSHIPS OF A DISTRICT 
COURT (D), THE CIRCUIT COURT (A), AND THE RELEVANT SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT (P) 
 Regime I 
 Regime II 
 Regime III 
 Regime IV 
Note: We refer to each set of relationships as a Regime. For more details on these four 
Regimes, please refer to the text. 
Our Relative Distance Hypothesis94 more formally articulates the 
relationship between D, A, and P found in Figure 4. It makes clear 
that if A is closer to P than D is to P, then the effect of Ideological 
Distance will be dampened. This interactive relationship between 
Ideological Distance and Relative Distance captures the constraint 
 
 94. The effect of Ideological Distance will be moderated by the relative distance of the 
appellate court and district court to the Supreme Court precedent. 
   P    D    A 
   P    A    D 
   A    P    D 
   A, D     P 
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the appellate courts can exert over the district courts as the latter 
anticipate the likely responses of the former to their decisions.  
VI. EMPIRICALLY TESTING THE SPATIAL MODEL 
To recapitulate, our principal objective is to test whether, when 
citing and interpreting Supreme Court precedent, federal district court 
judges take into consideration the preferences of their appellate court 
superiors. Below, we describe the data and variables that make this 
test possible. 
A. Unit of Analysis 
The dependent variables for this study consist of counts of the 
number of times federal district courts cite and legally interpret the 
2,274 Supreme Court opinions released during the Burger Court 
(1969-1985 Terms).95 More specifically, our data set contains an 
observation for each of these 2,274 cases for each of the 12 circuits 
for each year, starting in the year the Supreme Court case was 
decided and ending in 2005.96 For example, a case decided by the 
Supreme Court in 1975 has a total of 372 observations in our data set, 
with 12 observations (1 for each of the federal circuits) for the case in 
each year from 1975 through 2005. Our data set therefore contains a 
total of 722,410 observations for these 2,274 cases. Our statistical 
tests estimate the number of times a given district court cites or 
interprets a specific Supreme Court opinion in a particular year. 
B. Dependent Variables 
We examine three dependent variables regarding federal district 
courts’ usage of Supreme Court precedent. For each of them, we used 
Shepard’s Citations to determine the number of times, for each 
federal circuit, federal district courts cited or legally interpreted each 
 
 95. We drew these cases from MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 76.  
 96. We do not examine each of the ninety-four district courts separately and instead treat 
all district courts within the same federal circuit as constituting a single district court. Our 
analysis therefore aggregates these ninety-four separate district courts into each of the twelve 
circuits of which they are a part.  
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Supreme Court opinion in a given year. Shepard’s Citations is a legal 
citation service that, among other things, provides a list of all 
citations from American courts to each Supreme Court opinion. 
Shepard’s also offers an “editorial” analysis that determines the legal 
effect the citing case may exert on the cited case, meaning it indicates 
how the citing case legally interpreted the cited case.97 
Our first dependent variable examines the number of times district 
courts cite a Supreme Court opinion without legally interpreting it, 
meaning the district court refers to the case but does not use language 
in its decision that potentially affects the legal status of the precedent. 
Generally, this dependent variable contains what are commonly 
referred to as “string citations,” in which the citing case does little 
more than refer to the cited case and offers little in the way of 
meaningful discussion of it. We use the Shepard’s Citations 
categories of “cited by,”98 “explained by,”99 and “harmonized by”100 
 
 97. Shepard’s uses a set of rules to make these determinations, which can be found in two 
places. These coding protocols are located in an online description, available in the Shepard’s 
Product Guide on LexisNexis(R). Product Guide-Shepard’s Citations, http://www.lexis.com 
(follow “Lexis Nexis(R) Information & Training” hyperlink; then follow “Product Guide-
SHEPARD’S Citations” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Shepard’s Product 
Guide]. Their rules for making the subjective determination of the type of treatment a citing 
case delivers to a cited case is discussed more extensively in an unpublished training manual, 
which we refer to as “Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual.” Shepard’s Citations 
Unpublished Training Manual (1993) (on file with authors). Hansford & Spriggs show that 
Shepard’s coding protocols are reasonably valid (Shepard’s assignment of treatment 
designations actually captures the difference in positive and negative interpretation) and reliable 
(Shepard’s coding of decisions can be reproduced by other individuals), and thus they meet the 
exacting standards of social science. For a discussion of validity and reliability in the social 
sciences, see James F. Spriggs II & Thomas G. Hansford, Measuring Legal Change: The 
Reliability and Validity of Shepard’s Citations, 53 POL. RES. Q. 327 (2000), and Edward G. 
Carmines & Richard a. Zeller, Reliability and Validity Assessment, in QUANTITATIVE 
APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Sage University Papers Series No. 07–017, 1979).  
 98. Shepard’s labels a case as “cited by” if there is no language in the decision that would 
lead to an assignment of one of the substantive treatment categories, such as “followed” or 
“distinguished.” In other words, the citation is basically a string citation. See HANSFORD & 
SPRIGGS, supra note 83, at 44–46. 
 99. Shepard’s defines “explained by” as: “Statement of import of decision in cited case. 
Not merely a restatement of facts.” Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual, supra 
note 97, at 13. Although there is discussion of a case, it does not amount to a substantive legal 
interpretation of the cited case. On this point, see HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 83, at 44. 
 100. Shepard’s defines “harmonized by” as: “Apparent inconsistency explained and shown 
not to exist.” Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97, at 13. Although there is discussion of a 
case, it does not amount to a substantive legal interpretation of the cited case. See HANSFORD & 
SPRIGGS, supra note 83, at 44. 
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for this dependent variable, and we label it as Non-Treating Citations. 
Specifically, this measure is the total number of times, counted 
separately for each of the federal circuits and for each year, that 
Shepard’s Citations codes federal district court opinions as citing, 
explaining, or harmonizing a particular Court opinion.  
As discussed in Part IV, the presence of a citation can tell us 
something about law and legal development, but it does not provide 
information about the way in which a lower court deals with a 
precedent. We therefore also examine the substantive manner in 
which federal district courts legally interpret Supreme Court 
precedent. When a court interprets a precedent, it can shape it by 
restricting or broadening its applicability, and this treatment of the 
precedent potentially influences the shape of law regarding it.  
Hansford and Spriggs suggest the interpretation of precedent falls 
into two general categories: positive and negative treatment.101 
Positive interpretation takes place when a citing case relies on a 
precedent and in so doing reiterates its authoritativeness and possibly 
expands its scope. The citing case thus follows the cited case and 
indicates that it was “controlling authority.”102 By contrast, negative 
interpretation occurs when a citing case manifests some level of 
disagreement with a previous decision. Negative interpretation of a 
precedent may restrict its reach or even call into question its legal 
standing. For instance, a court can distinguish a precedent by finding 
it inapplicable to a new factual situation, limit a case by restating the 
legal rule in a more limited way, or (if it has the authority to do so) 
even overrule a case and declare that it is no longer binding. 
To measure positive and negative interpretation, we rely on 
Shepard’s Citations, which provides an editorial analysis capturing 
the potential legal effect of each citing case on the cited case. For 
each citing case-cited case pairing, Shepard’s Citations determines, 
as stated in its unpublished training manual, “[w]hat effect, if any, 
does the citing case have on the cited case?”103 This editorial analysis 
therefore provides substantive information about the way in which 
the citing case legally interpreted the cited case. For Shepard’s to 
 
 101. See Spriggs & Hansford, supra note 97, at 330. 
 102. Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual, supra note 97, at 17. 
 103. Id. at 13. 
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indicate that a citing case legally treated a cited case, it must do more 
than simply cite it. The citing case must provide specific language 
that has a potential effect on the legal authority or meaning of the 
precedent.104 Hansford and Spriggs provide a detailed discussion of 
the type of language an opinion must use in order for Shepard’s to 
assign one of these treatment categories, concluding that Shepard’s 
coding protocols lead to valid and reliable data.105 
Shepard’s considers a citing case to positively interpret a 
precedent if it “follows” the cited case. We therefore count a 
Supreme Court opinion as being positively interpreted by the lower 
courts if it was “followed by”106 or “paralleled by”107 a federal district 
court decision. We call this category Positive Treatment. These are 
the treatment categories that Shepard’s labels as “green signals,” 
meaning that there was positive treatment indicated in the language 
of the citing case.108 
Shepard’s labels a citing case as treating a cited case negatively if 
it potentially exerts a negative effect on the legal status of the 
precedent.109 We include four of Shepard’s coding categories into 
what we label Negative Treatment: “questioned by,”110 “limited 
by,”111 “criticized by,”112 and “distinguished by.”113 These categories 
are the ones for which Shepard’s assigns an “orange” or “yellow” 
 
 104. Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual states, for example, that “[m]erely 
citing or quoting, with nothing more, is not a sufficient expression of reliance to permit an ‘f’ 
(or any letter, for that matter).” Id. at 17. 
 105. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 83. 
 106. Shepard’s defines “followed by” as a citing opinion relying on the cited case as 
controlling or persuasive authority. Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 107. “Paralleled by” means the citing case relies on the cited case by describing it as “on all 
fours” or parallel to the citing case. Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 108. See Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 109. Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual, supra note 97, at 14, 24. 
 110. Shepard’s defines “questioned by” as the citing opinion questions the continuing 
validity or prececdential value of the cited case. Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 111. Shepard’s defines “limited by” as the citing opinion restricts the application of the 
cited case, finding its reasoning applies only in specific, limited circumstances. Shepard’s 
Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 112. Shepard’s defines “criticized by” as: “Soundness of decision or reasoning in cited case 
criticized for reasons given.” Shepard’s Citations Unpublished Training Manual, supra note 97, 
at 12. 
 113. Shepard’s defines “distinguished by” as: “The citing case differs from the cited cases 
either involving dissimilar factors or requiring a different application of the law.” Shepard’s 
Citations Unpublished Training Manual, supra note 97. 
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signal, meaning that the “validity” of the cited case has been 
“questioned” or that it has received “possible negative treatment,” 
respectively.114 As with our Non-Treating Citation dependent 
variable, we measure Positive Treatments and Negative Treatments 
as counts of the number of times, for each federal circuit in each year, 
Shepard’s indicates that a given Court opinion was legally treated in 
one of these ways. 
C. Independent Variables  
Our spatial model in Part V contains three moving parts: (1) the 
ideological location of each appellate court in each year, (2) the 
ideological placement of a district court in each year, and (3) the 
ideological location of each Supreme Court opinion. We therefore 
require a measure that can place the federal district court, appellate 
court, and Supreme Court precedent in the same one-dimensional 
ideological space. We do so by utilizing the Judicial Common Space 
scores (“JCS scores”) developed by Epstein et al., which provide a 
measure of the “ideal point” (that is, the ideological location) of each 
district court judge, appellate court judge, and Supreme Court Justice 
serving in the modern era.115  
To measure the location of each Supreme Court precedent, we use 
the median value of the common space scores for the Justices sitting 
on the Court the year in which the Court decided the precedent. To 
locate the position of the district court in each year, we use the 
median value of the common space scores for all district judges 
serving in a given federal circuit in a year. For an appellate court’s 
ideological location, we use the median score of all appellate court 
judges serving on that appellate court in a particular year.  
Using these data, we then created three independent variables to 
test our hypotheses. First, we measure Ideological Distance as the 
absolute value of the difference between the Supreme Court 
 
 114. See Shepard’s Product Guide, supra note 97. 
 115. JCS scores and the details for their compilation are on the project’s Web page. The 
Judicial Common Space, http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2009). Because district court judge scores are not publicly available, the authors have 
compiled these using the methodology employed in Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common 
Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007). 
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precedent and the district court median in a given year. Second, we 
measure Relative Distance as the absolute distance between the 
district court median and the Supreme Court precedent minus the 
absolute distance between the appellate court median and the 
Supreme Court precedent. 
Relative Distance takes on positive values when the appellate 
court is closer to the existing Supreme Court precedent than the 
district court is, and it assumes negative values when the district court 
is closer to Court precedent than the appellate court is. Another way 
of thinking about this measure is that it assumes positive values for 
all observations falling within Regime I (and some observations in 
Regime III), and it takes on negative values for all observations 
within Regime II (and some observations in Regime III). Relative 
Distance equals zero for cases in Regime IV, meaning the district 
court and appellate court share the same preference.116 Third, we 
include an interaction term between these two variables, Ideological 
Distance * Relative Distance, which enables us to test explicitly for 
whether, as our theory predicts, the influence of Ideological Distance 
varies based on whether the appellate court or district court is 
ideologically more proximate to the Supreme Court precedent.117 
This interaction term therefore assesses whether district court judges 
are constrained by their appellate court superiors through rational 
anticipation.  
The interpretation of each of these coefficients is the following. 
One interprets Ideological Distance as the effect of the ideological 
distance between the district court and the relevant Supreme Court 
precedent, under the condition that the appellate court and the district 
 
 116. Given our measurement strategy, it is possible for cases in Regime III to have the 
value of zero on Relative Distance, which would indicate that the appellate court and district 
court were equally spaced on opposite sides of the Court precedent. Our data contain no such 
observations, so we can interpret the coefficient for Ideological Distance as exclusively 
demonstrating its effect for Regime IV cases. Regimes I, II, III, and IV respectively contain 
19.3%, 34.8%, 26.3%, and 19.6% of the observations in our data.  
 117. Interaction terms permit researchers to test the hypothesis that the effect of one 
independent variable on the dependent variable is conditioned by a second independent 
variable. On the use of interactive terms, see Robert J. Friedrich, In Defense of Multiplicative 
Terms in Multiple Regression Equations, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 797 (1982), and Thomas Brambor 
et al., Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63 
(2006). 
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court are ideologically aligned (meaning the observation falls within 
Regime IV). We expect the coefficient on Ideological Distance to be 
negative for the Non-Treating Citation and Positive Interpretation 
dependent variables, and we predict that it will be positive for the 
Negative Interpretation model. Relative Distance captures the effect 
of this factor for precedents ideologically preferred by the district 
court (that is, when Ideological Distance equals zero). For both the 
Positive Interpretation and Non-Treating Citation dependent 
variables, we hypothesize the coefficient for Relative Distance will 
be positive, and we expect it to be negative in the Negative 
Interpretation model. The independent variable of most interest is the 
multiplicative term, Ideological Distance * Relative Distance, in that 
it directly tests for the constraining influence of appellate courts. 
Evidence of such a constraint will be found in a positive coefficient 
in the Non-Treating Citation and Positive Interpretation models, 
which would indicate that the negative coefficient on Ideological 
Distance becomes less negative if the appellate court is closer to the 
Supreme Court precedent than is the district court. Likewise, a 
negative coefficient on this interaction term in the Negative 
Treatment model demonstrates that district courts rationally 
anticipate their appellate court superiors in that the positive effect of 
Ideological Distance shrinks in magnitude when the appellate court is 
closer to the Court precedent than is the district court.  
D. Control Variables 
We include a series of control variables to help ensure that our 
estimate for the above variables of theoretical interest are not 
capturing variation in citation or treatment of Supreme Court 
precedent potentially due to other variables with which they are 
correlated. We draw these variables from prior research on lower 
court citation of Supreme Court precedent.118  
 
 118. See HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 83; Fowler et al., supra note 80; Ryan C. Black 
& James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 
45 HOUS. L. REV 621 (2008); Frank Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R. Johnson & Paul 
Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Analysis of Their Use and 
Significance, 2010 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming).  
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We include a series of control variables that do not vary for a 
given Supreme Court precedent over time. We control for the 
political salience of a case at the time it was decided, coded as one if 
the case was discussed on the front page of the New York Times the 
day after the Court decided it.119 We also use an additional measure 
for case salience, based on the number of amicus briefs filed on the 
merits in the case. Because the average number of briefs filed at the 
Court during the time period of our study increases substantially, our 
measure of Amicus Briefs is a z-score for the level of amicus 
participation in the case, measured as:  
Y Termin  Filed Briefs ofNumber  ofDeviation  Standard
Y) Termin  Filed Briefs ofNumber  Average  X Casein  Filed Briefs of(Number ×  
We also control for the nature of the voting and opinion coalitions 
in the opinion that scholars and judges often suggest condition how 
lower courts use Supreme Court precedent. We measure Number of 
Special Concurrences as the number of “specially” concurring 
opinions in a case, as determined by the Spaeth Database.120 We 
capture the size of the final majority coalition in the precedent with 
two dummy variables, and Final Vote Was Minimum Winning equals 
one if the final vote was 5–4 (in a nine- or eight-member Court) and 
Final Vote was Unanimous equals one if there were no dissenting 
Justices; non-minimum winning and non-unanimous final votes serve 
as the baseline comparison for these two variables. We measure 
Precedent Opinion Length as the total number of words in the 
Supreme Court opinion, as drawn from Black and Spriggs.121 They 
show that lower federal courts are more likely to cite and legally 
interpret longer Supreme Court opinions.122 We also include a 
variable for Case Complexity, for which we follow the literature123 
 
 119. Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 
(2000). 
 120. See Supreme Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (follow “The 
Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database” hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) 
[hereinafter Spaeth Database]. 
 121. Black & Spriggs, supra note 118. 
 122. Id. 
 123. MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 76; Timothy R. Johnson et al., Oral Advocacy Before 
the United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
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and use exploratory factor analysis124 to produce a single factor score 
for each case. The input to the factor analysis includes the number of 
legal issues and the number of statutes or laws under review in the 
case.125 Per Curiam Precedent equals one if the precedent-setting 
opinion was designated as per curiam by the Court. We also include 
two variables for the nature of the issue considered in the Court 
precedent—Constitutional Precedent equals one if the Court used the 
Constitution as the basis for the opinion, and Civil Liberties 
Precedent equals one if the opinion dealt with civil liberties. We 
measure Overruling Precedent as one if Shepard’s Citations indicates 
the opinion overruled a prior decision of the Court. Precedent Strikes 
Law as Unconstitutional equals one if Spaeth determined the opinion 
struck down a state or federal law as unconstitutional.126  
We further control for variables whose values can vary during the 
life of a case. To control for the possibility of changes in the way 
cases are cited over time, we include a variable, Citing Year, which 
takes on the value of the year being examined in a given observation 
of the data; that is, if the data point in question concerns the year 
1969, this variable would take on the value of 1969. We also control 
for an important characteristic of a case that varies both across cases 
and through time: its continuing relevance for law at the Supreme 
Court. To measure Legal Relevance of Precedent, we use a variable 
created by Fowler et al.,127 who used a quantitative technique in 
 
457 (2007).  
 124. Factor analysis in this context is a data-reduction technique that uses the correlation 
among two or more observed variables to produce a single variable, which one assumes to be a 
latent unobservable quantity and a linear function of the observed variables. See Jae-On Kim & 
Charles W. Mueller, Introduction to Factor Analysis: What It Is and How to Do It, in 
QUANTITIAVE APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Sage University Papers Series No. 07–
013, 1978). We therefore use factor analysis to model case complexity as an unobservable 
variable with manifestations in number of legal provisions and number of issues involved in a 
given case. 
 125. We drew these data from the Spaeth Database, supra note 120. We used Spaeth’s 
“LAW” variable to determine the number of constitutional provisions, statutes, or court rules at 
issue in a case, and we used the “ISSUE” variable to count the number of different legal issues 
in a decision. 
 126. Spaeth Database, supra note 120. 
 127. This measure uses both inward citations (i.e., citations to a given Supreme precedent 
from other Supreme Court opinions), and outward citations (i.e., citations within a given 
Supreme Court opinion to other Supreme Court cases) to measure how central each opinion was 
in the network of all opinions at the Court from 1791 through 2005. We use their measure of 
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social network analysis that examined patterns of citations within and 
across Supreme Court opinions to develop a measure of how central 
each opinion was in the entire network of Supreme Court law in each 
year of a case’s life. Larger values indicate that a case is more 
relevant in the network of law of the Court. We also control for the 
age of a case, given the now well-established empirical regularity of 
older cases being cited less often than younger cases, and this effect 
either switching directions or becoming smaller for exceedingly old 
cases.128 We measure this non-linear effect of age with two variables, 
Age of Precedent, which is the number of years since the Court 
decided an opinion, and the square of this number, Age of Precedent-
Squared. This quadratic formulation enables age to have a non-linear 
effect; specifically, it allows for the effect of age to switch directions 
at one point across the values of precedent age.129 To control for 
possible caseload effects across the district courts, we include a 
variable, District Court Caseload, measured as the total number of 
cases decided by the district courts in a particular circuit in a given 
year. Finally, to control for temporal dependencies within a Supreme 
Court case during time not otherwise captured by our other control 
variables, we include Lag of Dependent Variable, which is a one-year 
lag of the dependent variable being examined.  
Because our dependent variables are counts of events, we utilize a 
negative binomial regression model.130 Also, we use robust standard 
errors, clustered on Supreme Court precedents, to control for the 
 
Inward Relevance, and a more “inwardly relevant case is one that is widely cited by other 
prestigious decisions, meaning that judges see it as an integral part of the law.” Fowler et al., 
supra note 80, at 330. They further label inwardly relevant cases as those that are most 
“influential” in the network of law at the Supreme Court. Id. at 331. Their measure is based 
exclusively on citations within Supreme Court opinions and thus captures legal relevance of a 
case for the network of cases at the Court. Id. 
 128. HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra note 83; Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: 
An Event History Analysis of Lower Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 
64 J. POL. 534 (2002); Fowler et al., supra note 80; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). 
 129. See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 358–64 (3d ed. 1997) (discussing how one models a nonlinear relationship). 
 130. See, e.g., J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997). 
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possibility of the error term being correlated within a given Court 
precedent over time.131  
VII. RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the statistical results for our analysis. We begin 
our discussion with the results for the Positive Interpretation and 
Non-Treating Citation dependent variables because we predict 
similar effects for the independent variables. Our first hypothesis, 
which is a standard component of nearly any model of federal court 
decision-making, contends that district court judges will use Supreme 
Court precedent in ways consistent with their policy preferences. We 
thus expect that the further ideologically removed from a Supreme 
Court precedent district court judges are, the less likely they are 
either to string cite it or to interpret it positively. The coefficient for 
the variable capturing this relationship, Ideological Distance, is 
negative and statistically significant in both models. Strictly 
speaking, this particular coefficient indicates that district court judges 
are less likely to cite or positively interpret a Court precedent under 
the condition that the appellate court and the district court share the 
same preference for that precedent (that is, Relative Distance equals 
zero).  
 
 131. J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA 86 (2d ed. 2006). 
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TABLE 1: NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION OF THE NUMBER OF 
CITATIONS AND TREATMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINIONS OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME COURT BY DISTRICT COURTS, 1970–2005 
 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
 
Positive 
Treatment 
Non Treating 
Citation 
Negative 
Treatment 
 
Ideological Distance  
 
 
Relative Distance 
 
 
Ideological Distance x  
Relative Distance 
 
Constant 
 
 
-0.475* 
(0.062) 
 
0.304* 
(0.097) 
 
0.212 
(0.280) 
 
-105.64* 
(14.718)* 
 
 
-0.489* 
(.041) 
 
0.878* 
(0.078) 
 
-1.032 
(.200) 
 
-52.913* 
(7.904) 
 
 
-0.384 
(0.080) 
 
0.649 
(0.147) 
 
-0.460 
(0.480) 
 
-14.724 
(13.59) 
 
Alpha 
 
4.29* 
(0.414) 
 
2.029* 
(0.214) 
 
3.807* 
(0.26) 
  
Number of Observations 722410 722410 722410 
Note: * denotes p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. The full results are reported in the appendix. 
Our model includes a multiplicative term of Ideological Distance 
with Relative Distance, which means that one cannot calculate the 
effect of one without taking into consideration the observed value of 
the other. To determine whether the effect of Ideological Distance is 
different for values of Relative Distance other than zero, one must 
calculate the conditional coefficients and standard errors. That is, one 
can calculate the effect size and standard error of Ideological 
Distance for each observed value of Relative Distance.132 When 
considering the Positive Interpretation dependent variable, our data 
 
 132. See Friedrich, supra note 117, and Brambor et al., supra note 117, regarding the use 
of interaction terms. 
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indicate that the effect of Ideological Distance is negative and 
statistically significant for all values of Relative Distance less than or 
equal to -0.5757. This means that the effect of Ideological Distance is 
consistent with our expectations for 99.98% of the data in our study. 
When we turn to the relationship of Ideological Distance with Non-
Treating Citations, we uncover a similar relationship, and it is 
negative and statistically significant for all values of Relative 
Distance greater than or equal to -0.3485 (meaning this variable is 
significant for 98.44% of the data in this study).  
We also hypothesized that the coefficient on Relative Distance 
would be positive for both of these dependent variables, and the 
results support this expectation. This relationship shows that, when a 
district court prefers a Supreme Court precedent, it is even more 
likely to cite it or positively interpret it when the appellate court is 
closer to the precedent.133 Figure 5 depicts this effect (for positive 
citations) by plotting the effect of Ideological Distance for the 
minimum, mean, and maximum values of Relative Distance. As is 
visible from the figure, no matter the value of relative distance, a 
district court is more likely to positively cite to precedent when 
Ideological Distance between the court and the precedent is small. 
Similarly, the greater the value of Relative Distance, the more likely 
we are to see positive citation. We should point out that we do not 
interpret these two coefficients as demonstrating the constraining 
effect of appellate courts on district court judges. Rather, it suggests 
that district courts are free to act on their preferences when the 
appellate courts share those policy preferences.  
 
 133. We should point out that the values on Relative Distance must be less than or equal to 
zero because, when Ideological Distance equals zero (meaning the ideological location of the 
district court is the same as the location of Supreme Court precedent), it is not possible for an 
appellate court to be closer to the precedent than the district court is.  
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FIGURE 5: PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DISTRICT COURT 
OPINIONS CONTAINING ONE OR MORE POSITIVE CITATIONS TO 
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
 
 
Note: The probabilities are represented across the ideological distance 
between the district court and the precedent. The thick lines depict the mean 
predicted probability, and the thin lines show the upper and lower 95% 
confidence intervals on that probability. The top panel shows the 
probabilities while Relative Distance is held at its mean (0), and the bottom 
panels indicate Relative Distance at its minimum (-0.922) and maximum 
(0.595) values. All other variables are held at their median or modal values. 
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We now turn to the results for the interaction term, and, contrary 
to our spatial model’s predictions, we do not observe district courts 
taking the preferences of their appellate court superiors into 
consideration. Although the coefficient in the Positive Interpretation 
model is positive, as we predict, it is not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. In effect, this means that, although the magnitude of the 
effect of Ideological Distance does diminish when appellate courts 
are closer to Court precedent than the district courts, we cannot rule 
out that this change is due to random noise. The coefficient for 
Ideological Distance * Relative Distance is not even in the predicted 
direction in the Non-Treating Citations model.  
In light of the results for the prior two dependent variables, the 
results for the Negative Treatment model are puzzling. The data do 
not show that district court judges consider their own policy 
preferences when negatively treating Supreme Court precedent. In 
fact, the coefficient on Ideological Distance is opposite our 
prediction, suggesting that, for situations in which the appellate 
court’s and district court’s preferences are aligned, district judges are 
less likely to negatively treat a precedent if they dislike it. While the 
coefficient on Ideological Distance does become positive when 
Relative Distance is less than or equal to -0.835, the effect is not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. Moreover, even if this effect 
were statistically significant, the coefficient for Ideological Distance 
is positive for such a small range of the data (only 4.3% of the 
observations) that we would consider the effect to be substantively 
trivial. The coefficient on Relative Distance is also contrary to our 
model’s prediction. While the coefficient on the interaction term is 
appropriately signed, it is statistically insignificant, and, when 
considered in conjunction with the results for judge ideology, it does 
not offer support for a theory of constraint.  
In short, the data analysis convincingly demonstrates the effect of 
judge ideology on the citation and positive interpretation of Supreme 
Court precedent. Judges are more likely to cite precedent or follow it 
when the precedent is ideologically favorable. Our analysis, however, 
fails to find evidence that federal district court judges cite or interpret 
Supreme Court precedent based on the ideological location of the 
appellate court sitting above them.  
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CONCLUSION 
The hierarchical relationships of the federal judiciary are of major 
importance to many, and the present study takes steps forward in 
theoretically and empirically testing them. Our objective in this 
Article was to assess whether and to what degree district court judges 
rationally anticipate the Court of Appeals sitting above them. Our 
empirical tests consisted of examining whether district courts cited 
and interpreted Supreme Court precedent in light of their expectation 
of the appeals court’s preference toward a precedent. We based this 
hypothesis on a simple spatial model that included a district court, the 
relevant court of appeals, and Court precedent in a unidimensional 
ideological policy space.  
Our analyses uncover no evidence for the strategic anticipation 
hypothesis. We do, however, find evidence that district court judges’ 
ideological view of a Court precedent influences how often they cite 
and positively interpret it. Given the long line of literature that has 
found ideological considerations operating in judicial decision-
making across the judicial hierarchy,134 our results in this regard are 
not surprising. We also find that the frequency of citation and 
interpretation of Court precedents varies by both static characteristics 
of those precedents (e.g., length of the precedent) and dynamic 
attributes of them (e.g., continuing legal relevance at the Court and 
age of precedent). These results are largely consistent with prior 
literature on lower court usage of Supreme Court precedent.135 
Existing literature offers contradictory results regarding strategic 
anticipation. The null results in this Article provide valuable 
information, but further pursuing work on the federal judicial 
 
 134. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (Cambridge University Press 2002) (finding that Supreme 
Court Justices’ decisions are ideologically motivated); Virginia A. Hettinger et al., Comparing 
Attitudinal and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 123 (2004) (finding that ideological disagreement among judges is an 
important predictor of dissent); C.K. Rowland et al., Judges’ Policy Choices and the Value 
Basis of Judicial Appointments: A Comparison of Support for Criminal Defendants Among 
Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy Appointees to the Federal District Courts, 46 J. POL. 886 (1984) 
(finding that the party of the appointing President is an important predictor of district court 
judge decision-making).  
 135. See supra notes 80, 83, 118.  
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hierarchy is necessary to better understand this finding. There are a 
variety of ways that our analysis should be refined as scholarship on 
this question progresses. First, our spatial model is an individual-
level argument that leads to hypotheses about how a district court 
will behave with regard to a particular precedent. We then tested our 
hypotheses by aggregating data across all district courts within a 
particular circuit regarding their citation and treatment of a particular 
precedent in each year. While aggregate analyses of this sort can be 
illuminating, one loses information on various specifics that may 
assist in understanding hierarchical judicial relationships. One needed 
refinement is disaggregating the data so that each district court within 
a circuit is treated as a separate decision-maker. We think future 
research should also examine data at the individual case level, 
examining how district court judges, in a given citing case, choose to 
apply and interpret precedents relevant for it.136 This unit of analysis 
would allow one to use a more refined measure of variables such as 
district court and circuit court judge ideology and case characteristics.  
Future efforts might also model the dynamic nature of the 
Supreme Court. Our model here simply accounts for the ideological 
location of the Supreme Court precedent. It does not include the 
Court as a decision-maker in the model, and thus district courts are 
not modeled as strategically anticipating the Court. But, given that 
the preferences of the Court can and do change over time, the next 
logical step will be to also model the Supreme Court’s preferences at 
the time that the district court makes its decision. 
Implementing these changes will be no trivial feat. Collecting 
these additional data will be an arduous task. The spatial model will 
also have to be made more complex in order to generate the 
predictions coming from those relationships. As additional 
constraints are added, it becomes more difficult to model and 
empirically test all of the expectations. Because understanding the 
complicated and dynamic relationships that are inherent in the 
judicial hierarchy is so important, we commend others to also take on 
this task.  
 
 136. An example of such a unit of analysis can be found in HANSFORD & SPRIGGS, supra 
note 83. Their study, however, was not aimed at testing rational anticipation.  
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TABLE 1(A). FULL NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE 
NUMBER OF CITATIONS AND TREATMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINIONS OF THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT BY DISTRICT COURTS, 1970–2005 
 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
Independent Variables Positive 
Treatment 
Non Treating 
Citation 
Negative 
Treatment 
 
Ideological Distance 
 
  
Relative Distance 
 
 
Ideological Distance x Relative Distance 
 
 
New York Times 
 
 
Amicus Briefs 
 
 
Number of Special Concurrences 
 
 
Final Vote Was Minimum Winning 
 
 
Final Vote Was Unanimous 
 
 
Precedent Opinion Length 
 
 
Case Complexity 
 
 
Per Curiam Precedent 
 
 
Constitutional Precedent 
 
 
Civil Liberties Precedent 
 
 
-0.475* 
(0.062) 
 
0.304* 
(0.097) 
 
0.212 
(0.280) 
 
-0.078 
(0.095) 
 
0.018 
(0.010) 
 
-0.038 
(0.051) 
 
-0.039 
(0.081) 
 
0.034 
(0.078) 
 
0.00007* 
(0.00001) 
 
-0.005 
(0.030) 
 
-1.178* 
(0.344) 
 
-0.235* 
(0.080) 
 
0.135 
(0.086) 
 
-0.489* 
(.041) 
 
0.878* 
(0.078) 
 
-1.032 
(.200) 
 
-0.042 
(0.051) 
 
0.006 
(0.005) 
 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
 
0.001 
(0.046) 
 
.031 
(0.043) 
 
0.00005* 
(0.000008) 
 
0.025  
(0.016) 
 
-0.947* 
(0.259) 
 
-0.259* 
(.046) 
 
0.149* 
(0.047) 
 
-0.384 
(0.080) 
 
0.649 
(0.147) 
 
-0.460 
(0.480) 
 
0.045 
(.118) 
 
0.021* 
(0.009) 
 
-0.016 
(0.048) 
 
-0.030 
(0.078) 
 
-0.152 
(0.082) 
 
0.00005* 
(0.00001) 
 
0.033 
(0.030) 
 
-1.409* 
(0.264) 
 
-0.176* 
(0.082) 
 
-0.002 
(0.102) 
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 Coefficient (Robust Standard Error) 
Independent Variables 
 
 
Overruling Precedent 
 
 
Precedent Strikes Law as Unconst. 
 
 
Citing Year 
 
 
Legal Relevance of Precedent 
 
 
Age of Precedent 
 
 
Age of Precedent-Squared 
 
 
District Court Caseload 
 
 
Lag of Dependent Variable 
 
 
Constant 
 
Positive 
Treatment 
 
0.369* 
(0.147) 
 
-0.291* 
(0.122) 
 
0.051* 
(0.007) 
 
2.058* 
(.171) 
 
-0.169* 
(0.010) 
 
0.003* 
(0.000) 
 
0.000006* 
(0.0000005) 
 
1.007* 
(0.091) 
 
-105.638* 
(14.718)* 
Non Treating 
Citation 
 
0.256 
(0.132) 
 
-0.235* 
(0.065) 
 
0.026* 
(0.004) 
 
1.760* 
(0.113) 
 
-0.093* 
(0.006) 
 
0.001* 
(0.0001) 
 
0.000005* 
(0.0000003) 
 
.270* 
(.037)  
 
-52.913* 
(7.904) 
Negative 
Treatment 
 
0.457 
(0.188) 
 
-0.006 
(0.081) 
 
0.005 
(0.007) 
 
1.761* 
(.173) 
 
-0.157* 
(0.008) 
 
0.0034* 
(0.0002) 
 
0.000006* 
(0.0000007)
 
1.370* 
(0.051) 
 
-14.724 
(13.590) 
Alpha 
 
4.29* 
(0.414) 
2.029* 
(0.214) 
3.807* 
(0.26) 
Number of Observations 722410 722410 722410 
Note: * denotes p < 0.05 (two-tailed test). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Further 
discussion of the variables is available in the main text. 
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